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6.1  Introduction 
The Israeli stabilization program is considered a success: it resulted in a 
sharp and rapid reduction in the rate of inflation from over 400% per year in 
the mid-1980s to less than 20% per year thereafter. While the benefits from 
this heterodox program on the inflation front were visible from the beginning, 
some of  the costs associated with stabilization appeared with a considerable 
lag. After a pronounced consumption boom and an economic activity boom at 
the start of  the program, a recession emerged in early  1988, and no major 
transition from stabilization to growth was  observed. Clearly, some of  these 
developments could be explained by  changing conditions that were not neces- 
sarily associated with the stabilization program per se. In order to determine 
which elements of  the program could be applied to other countries, it is im- 
portant to evaluate whether there could have been ways to improve the benefits 
and/or reduce the costs of the program. 
Two important lessons from stabilization in Israel are quite uncontroversia1.l 
First, an important role in the design and success of  the heterodox program 
was played by a set of  social-political agreements (a sort of social pact) that 
were reached at that time. This took the form of a national-unity coalition that 
was built by  the main political parties, and broad agreements among represen- 
tatives of  labor, government, and industry, setting patterns for prices, wages, 
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and the exchange rate. Second, the stabilization effort was supported by exter- 
nal aid in the first two years of the program. Without this aid, more stringent 
(and probably less feasible) fiscal adjustments would have been  required to 
achieve the same degree of  disinflation that was observed ex post. Similarly, 
foreign aid provided support to the exchange rate targets that were chosen and 
helped avoid any balance-of-payments crises. 
With the benefit of hindsight, this paper draws some lessons from two key 
aspects of Israel’s disinflation; the transition  (or lack thereof) from stabiliza- 
tion to growth, and exchange rate policy. Accumulated  experience indicates 
that both these issues can play a key role in the success of a disinflation pro- 
gram. That is, major political  and economic difficulties were encountered by 
stabilizations that were associated with a slowdown in economic activity and 
did not eventually produce a transition to growth. Similarly, there are several 
well-known episodes in which an exchange rate-based  stabilization failed be- 
cause of speculative attacks on foreign currencies-attacks  that emerged in 
the face of lack of compatibility between exchange rate policy and the underly- 
ing fiscal and monetary fundamentals. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides an updated set of 
empirical regularities associated with the stabilization plan of  1985. Section 
6.3 discusses issues related to the transition from stabilization to growth. Vari- 
ous aspects of exchange rate policy are discussed in section 6.4. Section 6.5 
provides our main conclusions. 
6.2  Results from Stabilization 
In this  section, we discuss the main empirical regularities after the  1985 
stabilization  program in Israel. We focus on periods immediately before and 
after stabilization; for the latter we consider  1986-88.  Clearly, care is sug- 
gested in interpreting the evidence, as not all facts were associated with infla- 
tion stabilization per se, and other things were not equal. The main regularities 
are discussed here. 
Rapid disinjation. A marked reduction in inflation was already observed in 
the first few months following the implementation of the program in mid-1985. 
From annual rates of inflation in the triple-digit  range, the program quickly 
succeeded in bringing inflation down to about 16-20%  per year in the period 
from 1986 to  1991. Only in  1992 were there strong forces to bring  annual 
inflation to the single-digit range; see figure 6.1. Various price increase indica- 
tors are shown in table 6.1. 
Real exchange rate appreciation. While the nominal exchange rate of the new 
Israeli shekel (NIS) was held fixed for long periods, domestic prices rose at a 
higher rate than foreign prices, resulting in a real exchange rate appreciation 
(table 6.1). The real exchange rate of the NIS against the U.S. dollar appreci- 
ated at the considerable rates of  16% in 1986, 7% in 1987, and 11% in 1988. 179  Israel's Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
Table 6.1  The Exchange Rate and Relative Prices (rates of change) 
Nominal Exchange Rate 
(avg./avg.) (%)  Real Exchange Rate (avg./avg.) (%) 
Terms of 
Currency  Nondollar  Currency  Nondollar  Trade 




































































-  14.4 



















Tradable"  Price of Exports  Services Price Index 
CPI  Wholesale  (avg./  vs. Domestic Uses  Compared to 











































































Sources  Bank of  Israel Annual Report, Statistical Abstract of Israel 
dThe  five-currency basket was established in August 1986 For the period pnor to August 1986 the basket 
exchange rate is computed using the weights of the currency basket 
bU$ing  the effective rate in export 
'Using the official rate 
dBased on CPI pnces (Ben-Basat 1992) 
When expressed against a basket of foreign currencies, the real exchange rate 
appreciated at about 8% in  1986, 2%  in  1987, and 9% in  1988. In  August 
1986, a trade-weighted currency basket was officially adopted for fixing the 
exchange rate, instead of  the U.S. dollar. The composition of  one currency 
basket unit is 0.6 U.S. dollar, 0.4177 deutsche mark, 0.067 pound, 0.3394 
French franc, and 7.7 yen. The effective weights of  the various currencies in 
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Fig. 6.1 
Source: Statisrical Abstract of  Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Annual rate of inflation 
the composition of  the currency basket has been 55-60%  of  the U.S. dollar, 
35-40%  of European currencies, and about 5% of Japanese yen. Consequently, 
the real exchange rate against nondollar components of  the basket depreciated 
at  10% in  1986 and 6% in  1987, and it appreciated  at  10% in  1988.* The 
considerable real exchange rate appreciation that followed the program is evi- 
dent in various measures of  relative prices.  Specifically, the cumulative in- 
crease in the relative price of  nontraded  to traded goods over 1986-88  was 
32%; the relative price of exports against domestic uses decreased over that 
period by 20%; and the relative price of services to manufacturing goods rose 
by 48%. Notice that, at the same time, no major shifts were observed in Israel's 
terms of trade. 
Fiscal adjustment. Three main features highlight the major fiscal adjustment 
after the program. First, there was a major fall in the domestic government 
budget deficit, from 16% of GDP in 1984 to  1.3% of  GDP in 1986-88;  see 
table 6.2. This reflects an increase of about 8% of GDP in domestic revenues 
from 1984 to 1986-87,  and a reduction of about 7% of GDP in domestic gov- 
2. In comparison, the real exchange rate of the NIS vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar evolved quite differ- 
ently, as it appreciated 16% in 1986.7% in 1987, and 11% in 1988. This marked difference in real 
exchange rate development may have contributed to changes in the geographic composition Israel's 
trade. More specifically, during 1986-88 the share of exports to European destinations as percent- 
age of total exports of Israeli goods increased from 36% to 38%. while the share of exports to the 
United States decreased from 33% to 31%. Exports to Asia rose from 10% to  16%, and exports 
to all other destinations, which are conducted mainly in U.S. dollars, declined from 21% to 16%. 181  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
ernment expenditures. As far as the latter is concerned, the main items of gov- 
ernment expenditures that were reduced (as percentage of GDP) after the pro- 
gram were grants and subsidies (including credit subsidies and subsidies for 
production of  basic goods and utilities), and domestic defense expenditures. 
These trends show up in government’s total budget deficit, which also includes 
foreign revenues  and  expenditures. In  this  context,  an  important role  was 
played by the special foreign aid received from the United States, amounting 
to $1.5 billion in  1985 and  1986. Second, the stronger fiscal stance was re- 
flected in a reversal in the time path of domestic and foreign public debt ratios, 
from increasing trends before 1985 to marked reductions after 1985; see figure 
6.2. Specifically, domestic public sector debt decreased from 112% in 1985 to 
90% of GDP in 1989, and foreign public sector debt fell from 53% in 1985 to 
24%  in 1989; see table 6.2. Third, seigniorage played no major role in inflation 
or disinflation: it remained relatively stable at about 2-3%  of GDP before and 
after stabilization. Put differently, changing trends in the behavior of inflation 
were more closely associated with fluctuations in public debt ratios than with 
government seigniorage. 
Consumption boom. Prior to the stabilization program (i.e., between 1980 and 
1984), total private consumption grew at an average annual rate of  about 5% 
and consumption of durables (which were on average 13% of total consump- 
tion) grew at about 8% per year; see table 6.3. The consumption boom began 
at the first quarter after the program (i.e., the last quarter of  1985), when total 
private consumption increased by  13% in comparison to the previous quarter. 
This was led by a sharp increase in consumption of durable goods, which regis- 
tered a 36% increase in comparison to the previous quarter. The year of 1986 
is the most salient example of  the consumption boom phenomenon.  In that 
Table 6.2  Public Expenditure, Revenue, and Deficit (% of GDP) 
Public Sector Debt 
Deficit( -)/Surplus(  +)  (net) 









66.0  61.4  -4.6  -7.0  2.4  112.9  38.6 
72.0  60.2  -11.9  -16.0  4.2  106.9  48.7 
69.8  71.5  1.7  -6.3  8.0  111.8  52.9 
64.3  67.6  3.3  -1.2  4.5  110.6  40.3 
61.1  61.1  0.0  -1.2  1.3  100.5  31.2 
58.0  57.6  -0.3  -1.4  1.1  88.9  25.5 
57.4  53.4  -4.0  -6.0  2.0  89.8  23.6 
57.0  54.3  -2.7  -5.5  2.8  88.9  20.1 
3.1 







Source: Bank of Israel Annual Report. 
aExcluding government liabilities to the public associated with the 1983 bank share arrangement. 182  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
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Source: Statistical Abstract of  Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics; Bank of  Israel Annual Report 
Note: The domestic debt shown here includes government liabilities to the public that are 
associated with the 1983 bank share arrangement, This definition differs slightly from that 
shown in table 6.2. 
Public sector domestic net debt and inflation 
year, private consumption  rose by  15% (i.e., over 13% per capita), and con- 
sumption of durables increased by 50%. These figures clearly imply that the 
consumption boom applied to both durable and nondurable goods. Most of the 
increase in durable goods consumption was translated into an increase in im- 
ports  of  consumer goods; however,  notice that  imports of  nondurable  con- 
sumption goods also increased, outpacing nondurable domestic consumption. 
The consumption boom continued, though somewhat moderated, in 1987. To- 
tal consumption rose by 9% in that year, and consumption of durables grew at 
13%. The boom lasted for about two and a half years and came to a half after 
the first quarter  of  1988. In  1989, total private  consumption remained  un- 
changed from the level of  the previous year, while consumption of  durable 
goods declined by 13%. 
Completing a cycle: Postboom recession. To a large extent, these developments 
in private consumption spending were reflected in fluctuations in economic 
activity. In the two years after the program, that is 1986-87,  the rate of growth 
of GDP was 5% per year, which is double the rate of growth that prevailed for 
1984; see table 6.4. This boom in economic activity was not  spread evenly 
across various sectors in the economy. That is, while there was a strong growth 
performance  in the nontradables  sector, whose output grew at 7.5% per year 
in 1986-87  compared to less than 2% per year in 1981-85,  rates of growth for 183  Israel's Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
Table 6.3  Private Consumption (rates of change, real terms) 
Imports of Consumption Goods 
Consumption (B)  (%)  Durable Consumption 
Population  Growth beyond Total 
Growth  Durable  Durable  Consumption Growth 











2.4  13.0  9.4 
1.8  8.0  7.2 
2.0  8.7  6.7 
1.2  -7.0  -2.4 
2.0  0.7  0.8 
1.8  14.8  10.3 
I .6  9  .0  8.5 
1.7  4.3  4.1 
1.7  0.0  1.7 
3.1  5.3  4.0 
-  -  43.6 
13.3  9.1  11.5 
20.9  8.5  -5.9 
-31.8  -18.8  -13.3 
-0.0  -4.6  I .4 
49.1  39.3  31.6 
13.2  13.5  11.7 
5.8  12.7  10.0 
-12.8  -8.4  2.3 





















Durable  Relative Price Index: 



















































Sources: Bank of Israel Annual Report; Stutisrical Abstracr of  Israel. 
"Based on national account consumption prices, annual averages. 
the tradables sector remained unchanged at about 4.5% per year.3 Along simi- 
lar lines, the rate of  growth of  output in manufacturing rose modestly from 
4-5%  per year from the period before to after the program, yet  the rate of 
growth of output in the services and commerce sector almost doubled, from 
4% to 7% per year, from 1981-85  to 1986-87.  These trends were reversed in 
1988-89. On average, GDP growth slowed down to about 2%  per year in that 
period, and there was a decline in output of the traded goods sector of  about 
1% per year, led by  a decline in industrial sector's production of about 2.4% 
3. The tradable  sector  includes  manufacturing,  agriculture,  sea and air transportation,  and 
tourism. 184  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
Table 6.4  Economic Growth (rates of change, real terms, %) 
Total Factor 
Gross Product Growth  Productivity 
Population  Total  Business  Industrial  Services &  Business  Industrial 















































































Sources: Bank of  Israel Annual Report; Statistical Abstract of  Israel. 
per year. The slowdown was also present in the nontraded sector, whose out- 
put’s growth was reduced yet remained positive at 3.4% per year. Interestingly, 
the program was followed initially  by  a rise in both total factor productivity 
and labor productivity relative to their levels prior to stabilization. Productivity 
further increased in 1990, along with a process of restructuring and rationaliza- 
tion of operations in business and activity. 
Rise in wages beyond productivity. Coupled with wage controls, the devalua- 
tion and rises in controlled prices at the start of the program were associated 
with a decrease in the real wage in 1985 of 9% over all sectors; see table 6.5. 
However, the  relaxation  of  controls  and the heating  up of  the  economy  in 
1986-87  were accompanied by  marked real wage increases of  8% per year, 
which clearly outpaced increases in labor productivity (by about 6 percentage 
points per year). The program did not result in a noticeable change in the econ- 
omy’s rate of unemployment. Only after four years into the program did the 
rate of unemployment markedly rise, to 9.6% in 1990. Increased employment 
was associated, to a large extent, to a cumulative decline of about 5% in indus- 
trial sector employment during the recession years of  1988-89,  and with an 
increase in the participation rate in the labor force. 
Monetary expansion. Disinflation in Israel was followed by substantial expan- 
sion of monetary aggregates, both in nominal and real terms. This is particu- 
larly the case of M1 and M2 growth in 1986-87.  Broader aggregates, such as 
M3 and M4, showed much more moderate increases. To a large extent, these 
movements reflect a shift in the financial portfolio of the private sector, away 
from indexed bonds and foreign exchange assets to nonindexed short-term do- 185  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
Table 6.5  Labor and Wages (rates of change, real terms, %) 
Real Wage per Employee  Output per Labor 
POStA  Employment  Hour 
All  Business  Industrial  All  Business  Industrial  Business  Industrial  Unemp. 












-3.1  -0.5  0.1  1.1  1.7  -1.0  3.9  0.3  4.8 
11.6  12.4  10.4  2.0  2.6  2.5  2.3  5.0  5.1 
-1.5  -0.3  3.5  1.4  1.5  1.2  0.3  -0.8  5.0 
6.2  4.7  5.2  3.2  4.3  2.2  1.4  2.3  4.5 
-0.4  -1.2  1.9  1.5  1.8  0.3  -1.6  2.7  5.9 
-9.0  -6.5  -7.4  0.7  1.9  -0.2  2.  I  3.2  6.7 
7.8  9.1  7.0  1.4  I .7  4.2  1.5  1.6  7.1 
7.9  8.0  7.1  2.6  3.9  1.9  3.1  4.9  6.1 
6.0  4.7  3.7  3.5  3.2  -2.1  2.2  1.5  6.4 
-1.3  -1.7  0.9  0.5  -0.0  -2.5  0.5  4.4  8.9 
-1.0  -1.6  0.0  2.1  2. I  2.8  3.9  7.4  9.6 
Sources: Bank of Israel Annual Report; Statistical Abstract of  Israel. 
*Excluding  labor from territories. 
Table 6.6  Monetary Aggregates (nominal terms) 
Inflation  Asset Growth (a)  Velocity (Y/W 
(avglavg.)  Total Credit 





























































26.8  18.1  5.4  3.3  58.8 
30.2  16.9  5.2  3.3  148.3 
36.5  16.5  5.0  3.4  136.1 
55.6  19.7  4.6  3.6  366.2 
45.8  11.2  4.2  3.3  317.5 
26.6  7.7  4.5  3.3  64.1 
21.1  5.7  4.2  3.1  39.4 
19.7  5.5  4.3  3.2  22.7 
18.8  5.6  4.4  3.2  41.4 
18.1  5.6  4.4  3.1  23.8 
Sources: Bank of Israel Annual Report; Statistical Abstract of  Israel 
mestic currency assets, most of  which are included in M2 (see table 6.6, in 
particular the drop in  velocities of  M1  and M2). This picture of  monetary 
expansion held despite the initial attempt to use a restrictive credit policy as a 
key ingredient of monetary policy under disinflation-an  attempt that was not 
effective enough over time. In  fact, real credit to the public showed marked 
increases from mid-1986 onward. While monetary expansion was  accompa- 
nied by  a sharp reduction in nominal interest rates, ex post real interest rates 
remained extremely high (i.e., at about 35% for debitory rates) during 1986-87 186  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
Table 6.7  Interest Rates: Short-Term Credit 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Nominal interest rates 
Total credit  205.5 
Directed"  176.2 
Nondirected  214.8 
Debitory rate  181.6 
Real interest rates 
(ex post) 
Total credit  5.1 
Directed  -5.0 
Nondirected  8.3 
Debitory rate  -3.1 
Average interest rate, 
real terms (ex post)h 
Business sector  7.9 
Industrial sector  4.7 
Share of directed credit 
in short-term credit usage 
Business sector  41.6 
Industrial sector  75.0 
Total short-term credit 
per output 
Whole economy  24.8 
Industrial sector  30.8 
576.8  234.5 
567.0  188.9 
582.8  260.5 
771.0  443.7 
24.2  17.3 
22.4  I .3 
25.3  26.4 
59.8  90.6 
32.6  17.5 
33.8  11.7 
43.3  43.9 
76.8  76.1 
22.6  25.6 

























































Sources: Bank  of  Israel Annual  Report: Statistical Abstract  of  Israel; Ben-Rawe (1989); Bruno 
and Meridor (1991). 
*Directed credit is credit allocated by  the government. The interest rate of  this credit is typically 
below the market (i.e., nondirected) rate. Total credit is the sum of short-term directed and non- 
directed credit. 
hWeighted average based on the actual composition of  credit usage according to directednon- 
directed credit and credit in domestidforeign currency. 
(table 6.7). Starting in  1988, there was a gradual process of  reduction in ex 
post  real  interest rates, which  still remained relatively  high.  In  any case, it 
should be stressed that ex ante real interest rates may well have behaved quite 
differently from ex post rates precisely at times of change in policie~.~ 
Reduction in investment and improvement of the current account. In the two 
years following the implementation of  the stabilization program, the current 
account registered an average annual surplus in the order of 5% of GDP. This 
surplus contrasts the current account deficit in the order of 6% of total national 
that existed in 1981-84.  Not surprisingly, this  surplus was partly  associated 
4. Interest rate trends over this period also reflected the impact of  various monetary and capital 
market reforms. 187  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
with the marked increase in foreign aid. On average, a current account surplus 
of  1.5% of GDP prevailed during 1988-89,  mainly due to a decrease in the 
import surplus, which partially  offset the decrease in unilateral transfers to 
Israel; see table 6.8. 
Alternatively, we can examine current account  developments in terms of 
fluctuations in gross national saving and investment. Following this approach, 
the current account surplus of  1986-87  was a result of a decline in investment 
and unchanged savings (as a percentage of total national income). Following 
the implementation of the stabilization program there was a marked decline in 
investment from over 20% of GDP during  1981-84  to 18% in 1986-87;  this 
was due mainly to a decline in investment in residential construction. Gross 
national savings varied slightly around 18% of GDP during 198  1-84,  increased 
somewhat to about 20% in 1986-87,  and returned to about 18% in  1988-89. 
Although  total  national  savings did  not  change  much,  there  were  marked 
changes in the composition of savings, as the public sector shifted from being 
a negative-saving sector prior to the stabilization program to a positive-saving 
sector in the first two years after the program. As the saving ratio of the public 
sector increased, there was a decrease in the saving ratio of the private sector. 
Put differently, the private consumption boom of  1986-87  resulted in a saving 
ratio deduction from 27% to about 16% of GDP. These offsetting trends in 
components of national saving, much as in a Ricardian equivalence framework, 
are depicted in figure 6.3. 
In our view, a unified overall theoretical explanation of the foregoing empiri- 
cal regularities is still missing. While the observed inflationhnemployment 
developments do not conform with traditional, money-based disinflations, they 
can be partly explained by invoking models of exchange rate-based  disinfla- 
tion. Other developments can be explained by lack of full credibility of poli- 
cymakers. Models such as Fischer’s (1986) and Calvo’s and Vkgh’s (1991) pre- 
dict that an immediate drop in inflation and a real exchange rate appreciation 
follow an exchange rate-based  stabilization program. By pointing out the lack 
of credibility, Calvo and V6gh (1991) are able to account for a consumption 
boom in the aftermath of disinflation. However, their explanation is not com- 
plete, in that it does not seem to fully account for the rise in real interest rates5 
after the program. Another somewhat puzzling feature of the data is that both 
inflation and disinflation were not tightly linked to fluctuations in seigniorage. 
This feature provides some scope for models based on economic agents’ ex- 
pectations of future monetary and fiscal adjustments in response to observed 
underlying trends in public debt. In this context, there is a remarkable comove- 
ment between public debt ratios and the behavior of the rate of inflation, much 
in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace (1981). 
5.  Notice that money-based stabilization models are capable of explaining increases in the real 
interest rate but at the same time cannot explain a consumption boom, as in exchange rate-based 
models. Table 6.8  External Balance 
Billions of Dollars, Deficit(  -)/Surplus( +  )"  % of GDP 
Trade  Import  Unilaterial  Current  Foreign  Trade  Import  Unilaterial  Current  Foreign 



















































12.59  -10.6 
15.24  -11.9 
17.54  -12.7 
18.69  -9.4 
18.42  -8.0 
18.21  -7.9 
18.21  -9.2 
18.52  -6.5 
16.24  -5.3 
15.56  -6.8 
-  17.5 
-  17.7 
-  17.0 
-  17.5 
-16.1 















-4.1  54.4 
-7.7  62.0 
-7.1  64.0 
-4.9  71.8 
4.6  76.5 
5.5  61.1 
-2.4  51.4 
-1.5  42.7 
2.5  36.6 
1.4  29.9 
Sources: Bank of Israel Annual Report; Statistical Abstract of  Israel. 
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Fig. 6.3  Net savings as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Sfufisricul  Abstrucr of  Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics. 
6.3  Transition (or Lack Thereof) from Stabilization to Growth 
Disinflation in Israel was not accompanied by a fast transition to sustained 
growth. In fact, the growth performance of the economy deteriorated consider- 
ably after the late 1970s. In the decades of the  1950s and 1960s, real GDP 
grew annually at an average rate of about lo%, and total factor productivity 
grew at about 4.55 per year. In the late 1970s, GDP growth became 3% per 
year, and total factor productivity grew by less than  1% per year. While the 
consumption boom at the initial stages of the 1985 stabilization program con- 
tributed to maintain  and  even accelerate the level of economic  activity, the 
latter was not sustained. In fact, a recession developed in  1988-89,  and the 
growth rate became less than 2%  per year. Underlying  these developments 
were decreases in the rates of growth of public and private sector investments, 
which made the transition to growth more difficult. In this section, we examine 
the links between private  and public  investment and growth, as well as the 
relation between exports and growth. 
Figure  6.4  provides  evidence  on  various  indicators  of  investment  and 
growth. The period after the stabilization program was characterized by rela- 
tively low ratios of public and private sector investment to GDP. These ratios 
were low both by Israeli historical standards and by international comparisons. 
While total investment reached about 27% of GDP in the 1970s, it declined to 
a level of 17% of GDP between 1985 and 1990. The deterioration in the pattern 
of investment is reflected in a marked decrease in the capitaYoutput ratio, de- 
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output  ratio after 1985. As far as international comparisons are concerned, 
investment as a percentage of GDP was about 21% in industrialized countries, 
and it was 22% in the rapidly growing East Asian developing countries (see 
figure 6.5). 
The finding that there is an empirical relation between economic growth and 
the share of investment in GDP has been documented in numerous studies of 
various countries; hence, is is not unique to Israel. For example, in a cross- 
section regression including  101 countries over the period  1960-89,  Levine 
and Renelt (1990) confirmed the robustness of earlier findings that the coeffi- 
cient on the ratio of investment to GDP has significant explanatory power for 
the rate of growth of real per capita income. Similar results were reported by 
Fischer (1991), based on a pooling of  cross section and time series for the 
period 1972-85. This relation is also clear from figures 9 and 10  in Dornbusch 
(1991), which plot the investment/GDP ratio against GDP growth for thirty- 
three  developing  countries for the periods  1965-73  and  1974-84.  Perhaps 
Chile is the best-known example of a close relation between strong economic 
growth in recent years and a marked increasing trend of the investment share 
in GDP; see figure 6.6. The relation is also characteristic of comparisons in- 
volving industrialized countries. To take two extremes, over the period 1963- 
90 Japan’s GDP grew at a rate of  6% per year, and the investment/GDP ratio 
was equal to 0.22. Over the same time period, the United Kingdom’s GDP 
growth rate was 1% per year, and the share of investment in GDP was about 
0.125 (see Auerbach  1992).6  The notion that, other things equal, an increase 
in the share of  investment in GDP will be associated with an increase in the 
rate of growth of output is familiar from standard growth accounting. The latter 
implies that an x%  increase in the investment ratio increases output growth 
by that x%  times the product of the outputkapital ratio and capital’s share in 
production.  Yet  growing evidence indicates that the observed effects of in- 
creases in the investment/GDP ratio on growth are much larger than what is 
implied by such arithmetics of  growth (see, e.g., Auerbach 1992 and De Long 
and Summers 1991). Put differently, it can be argued that capital accumulation 
has not only direct effects on growth but also, and not less important, indirect 
effects in the form of increased inducements for innovation and for the adop- 
tion of new technologies that lead to an increase in total factor productivity. 
Some of these indirect effects may well take the form of “spillovers,” social 
returns  to investment that are not fully captured by  individual investors, as 
emphasized in the recent endogenous growth literature; see Helpman (1 992). 
Work by De Long and Summers (1991) has emphasized that investments in 
machinery and equipment are one category of investment that is characterized 
by these spillover effects. Based on the cross-sectional distribution of  growth 
rates across economies in the post-World  War I1 period, the authors find evi- 
dence in support of the hypothesis that investments in machinery and equip- 
6.  Obviously, these findings must be interpreted with care because other things may  not be 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
ment are a strategic factor in growth, and do carry substantial benefits. Figure 
6.7 illustrates these relations based on time series for Israel (using three-year 
moving averages). It is seen that the marked decrease in the rate of growth of 
total factor productivity observed after  1987 was preceded  by  a marked de- 
crease in net growth of machinery and equipment, and that other periods have 
a close link between these variables. 
Public sector investments,  in particular in infrastructures, are another im- 
portant category of total investment, one that has been associated with public 
good-type  spillovers. As shown in table 6.9 and figure 6.8, there has been a 
clear trend of decrease in the ratio of investment in infrastructure to GDP in 
Israel, which was equal in the  1980s to only 50% its level in the  1960s. Al- 
though some increase in the ratio was registered after the 1985 program, the 
level is much lower than what is given by the historical  standard^.^ Investments 
in infrastructures picked up only recently, in response to the wave of migration 
from the former Soviet Union. The role of public sector capital for growth has 
been assessed for Israel using time series and a production function-growth 
accounting framework, in which the rate of growth of output is related to the 
rates of  growth of private and public capital and employment, by Hercowitz, 
Leiderman, and Siddi (1992), who find evidence in support of constant returns 
to scale on the private sector inputs and a coefficient of 0.4, which is statisti- 
7. Similarly, a temporary increase (of 13.5%) in overall gross investment in fixed assets is also 
noted in  1987. This increase is mainly compensatory after three years of decline in investment, 
which cumulatively amounted to an 18% decline. The 1987 increase merely restored the real level 
of gross investment in fixed assets to the 1982-83  average. 194  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
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productivity change 
Source: Bank of Israel Annual Report. 
Note: Three-year moving averages used. 
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Table 6.9  Investment in Infrastructure as a Percentage of Israel’s GDP 
(five-year averages) 
1965-70  4.3 
1970-75  3.9 
1975-80  3.3 
1980-85  2.8 
1985-90  2.6 
cally significant, on public sector capital.8 Similar results were obtained by 
Bregman and Marom (1992), based on a pooling of time series and cross sec- 
tion for Israel. These results are quite similar to those obtained by  Aschauer 
(1989) for the United  States. While these findings are certainly controver- 
sial, because of  their strength and the simplicity of  the methodology used 
they all point to a relation that is less controversial in both theory and casual 
evidence. 
Does the recovery of growth after stabilization necessarily require real ex- 
change rate depreciation and export-led growth? The independent role of ex- 
ports as percentage of  GDP in the process of  growth is less clear and more 
controversial, in theory and facts, than that of the investment share discussed 
above. Figure 6.9 provides evidence for three countries: Chile, Mexico, and 
8. The authors used annual data for these variables from 1960 to 1988. 195  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
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Fig. 6.8  Israel: infrastructure, investment, and strain 
Source: Bank of Israel Annual Report (1990). 
Israel. Chile represents an example of export-led growth. Between 1981 and 
1986, the authorities succeeded in producing a real devaluation of nearly 40%. 
At the same time, there was a boom in exports. Similar evidence about the 
relation between GDP growth, investment growth, and the exportlGDP ratio 
holds for Mexico, yet after considering different subperiods. At variance with 
Chile, however, there was a real exchange rate appreciation throughout. 
What are the lessons for stabilization policy? We have documented the fact 
that, as far as investment and growth are concerned, the initial conditions of 
the 1985 program were not strong. This was especially the case for the stock 196  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
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Fig. 6.9  GDP growth versus investment and exports 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
of public sector capital, including infrastructures. Moreover, after the program 
(and until  the beginning of the immigration from the former Soviet Union) 
there was no marked renewal of investment  and growth. Although  some of 
these developments were due to factors not necessarily related to the stabiliza- 
tion ~rogram,~  the program embodied no specific direct policy measures aimed 
9. These factors include (1) the uprising in the administered territories, which had adverse ef- 
fects on tourism, increased absenteeism of  labor supply from the temtories, created a decline in 197  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
at reversing this state of affairs. The policy was one of “stabilize inflation first, 
and deal with growth later.” It was also argued at the time that the reduction in 
inflation per se would lead to a reallocation of resources, away from the finan- 
cial sector and back into the real sector, that would increase measured output 
and productivity. Perhaps the main lesson here is that, already at the stage of 
disinflation, it is important to undertake policies that would facilitate a rapid 
transition to growth, for example, increasing public investment in infrastruc- 
ture. This would be especially important in countries such as Israel, where the 
initial conditions are not extremely conducive to investment and growth, and 
in countries in which investors face a relatively large option value of waiting 
(see Dornbusch  1991). The recovery  of  investment takes time, especially  at 
times of transition in economic policies. There are fiscal and industrial policies 
that can speed up the transition from stabilization to growth. However, the real 
dilemma for policy is to find the resources that would enable adopting these 
measures without jeopardizing a key ingredient of stabilization: a reduction in 
government spending and in the budget deficit. Perhaps the resolution of this 
dilemma is in the role of international institutions in providing support in the 
form of long-term loans, heavily conditioned on implementation of new poli- 
cies, aimed at enhancing the transition from stabilization to growth (see Dorn- 
busch 1991). 
6.4  Evolution of Exchange Rate Policy 
We begin this section by discussing the various stages of exchange rate pol- 
icy in Israel after stabilization. Then we shift to a discussion of  Israel’s ex- 
change rate band, a regime that was adopted in January 1989. Last, we provide 
new evidence on the relation between real exchange appreciation, world de- 
mand, and the performance of exports. 
6.4.1  Exchange Rate-Based  Stabilization 
As indicated, the nominal exchange rate was used as a key anchor for disin- 
flation in Israel. There were three main stages in the evolution of exchange rate 
policy after 1985. First, a fixed exchange rate of 1.5 NIS per U.S. dollar was 
adopted at the start of the program after an initial devaluation of  19.1%. The 
authorities themselves made no commitment to keep the exchange rate irrevo- 
cably fixed. In fact, announcements were made that the exchange rate would 
be adjusted if there were wage increases or other pressures, on prices, beyond 
the original targets. 
Still as part of the original fixed exchange rate policy, there was a technical 
demand for Israeli output by the territories, and produced greater uncertainty and increased domes- 
tic defense expenditure; (2)  the cancellation of  the Lavi aircraft project; and (3)  severe financial 
distress in several major segments of the manufacturing sector (Koor, the kibbutzim). Factors 2 
and 3 are not unrelated to the stabilization program per se. 198  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
change in August  1986, when it was decided to peg the domestic currency's 
exchange rate to a basket of foreign currencies (instead of to the U.S. dollar). 
The change was clearly motivated by  the sharp fluctuations in international 
exchange rates at that time (i.e., the U.S. dollar was depreciating in world cur- 
rency markets) and by the fact that, in addition to the United States, European 
countries are important trading partners of Israel. 
Throughout the second half of  1985 and during 1986 domestic prices rose 
at a higher rate than foreign prices, resulting in a gradual loss of competitive- 
ness of  domestic products. In January  1987, there was a 10% devaluation of 
the domestic currency against the basket. Domestic prices continued to rise at 
a higher rate than foreign prices in 1988, at which time devaluation expecta- 
tions built up considerably. Figure 6.10 shows the increasing trend in foreign 
currency purchases by the private sector associated with this buildup of expec- 
tations. In late December 1988 and early  1989, another devaluation was ef- 
fected, this time as part of a shift to the second stage of exchange rate policy: 
the unilateral adoption of an exchange rate band. 
Israel's exchange rate band from 1989 to 1991 was characterized by  a pre- 
announced fixed nominal reference (or central parity) exchange rate and a spe- 
cific band width; see Helpman and Leiderman (1992) and Helpman, Leider- 
man, and Bufman (1994) for further analysis and details. Initially the width of 
the band was set at +3%  around the reference rate. The width was expanded 
to  -+5% in 1990. Various parameters and characteristics of the exchange rate 
band  are shown in table 6.10. The adoption of  an exchange rate band  was 
viewed as a useful way to allow for short-run flexibility of  the nominal ex- 
change rate without necessarily abandoning the role of the exchange rate as a 
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Source: Bank of Israel, Research Department database. Table 6.10  Israel’s Exchange Rate Band: Band Characteristics,  Exchange Rate, Interest Rates, Prices, and 
Foreign Currency Reserves 
Band  1  Band 2  Band 3  Band 4  Band 5  Band 6 
Crawling Band 
1989.01-89.06  1989.07-90.02  1990.03-90.08  1990.09-91.02  1991.03-91.1 1  1991.12-92.10 
Band characteristics and the exchange rate 
(using daily data) 
Midband rate (NISibasket) 
Band width +/-(%) 
Crawl of midband rate, annualized (%) 
Average exchange rate 
Average deviation of exchange rate from 
Standard deviation from midband (%) 
Average domestic interest rate 
(monetary auction rate) 
Standard deviation of domestic interest 
rate 
Average foreign interest rate (LIBID)” 
Average interest differential (Israel- 
Annualized average interest differential 
Standard deviation of interest rate 
midband (%) 
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0.20  0.21  0.09  0.07  0.30  0.08 Table 6.10  (continued) 
Band  I  Band 2  Band 3  Band 4  Band 5  Band 6 
Crawling Band 
1989.01-89.06  1989.07-90.02  1990.03-90.08  1990.09-91.02  1991.03-91 .I 1  1991.12-92.10 
Inflation (using monthly data, % per month) 
Average domestic inflation rate (CPI)  1.11  1.01  I .34  0.88  1.47  0.66 
Average foreign inflation rate (CPI)”  0.44  0.30  0.35  0.25  0.27  0.25 
Average inflation differential (Israel- 
foreign)  0.67  0.7 I  0.98  0.63  1.19  0.4 I 
Annualized average inflation differential  8.38  8.83  12.47  7.85  15.28  5.07 
Standard deviation of inflation 
differential  0.07  0.15  0.04  0.02  0.12  0.28 
Foreign currency reserves (nongold) (using 
monthly data, in millions of dollars per month) 
Average change in reserves  203  0  -28  238  -  32  -  96 
Standard deviation of change in reserves  525  212  258  363  500  398 
Sources; Bunk of  Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. 
“Weighted  average, using Israel’s currency basket weights. LIBID = London interbank interest on deposits. 201  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
key nominal anchor-a  role that was now attributed to the preannounced cen- 
tral parity rate. 
Figure 6.11 depicts the behavior of the nominal exchange rate of the NIS 
against the basket of foreign currencies under the band. It is evident that during 
the first months after the adoption of the band the exchange rate was positioned 
in the lower half of the band. This may have well been the result of market 
forces, but there is evidence that official intervention, aimed at avoiding infla- 
tionary pressures of  currency depreciation, played a role in ensuring such an 
outcome. As domestic prices continued to increase at a higher rate than foreign 
prices, there were several realignments (i.e., upward adjustments, or devalua- 
tions, in the central parity rate) of the band with the objective of avoiding a 
deterioration in the less international competitiveness of exports. In fact, there 
were five such realignments in less than two years! (see table 6.10 and figure 
6.11). Although these periodic adjustments of  the central parity rate contrib- 
uted to avoiding real exchange rate appreciation and were not accompanied by 
a rise in inflation, during the 1989-91  period, there was substantial uncertainty 
about the timing and size of these exchange rate adjustments. Increased uncer- 
tainty, lack of full credibility, and a buildup of expectations toward a realign- 
ment were associated with increases in the domestic-foreign  interest rate dif- 
ferential, which then decreased after realignments.  Figure 6.12 illustrates the 
important degree of interest rate volatility that was associated with this period. 
The increased speculative purchases of foreign currencies and increased do- 
mestic interest rates that were observed in Israel in anticipation of devaluations 
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are quite similar to those observed before realignments  in Europe under the 
European monetary  system (EMS); see Helpman  and Leiderman  (1992) for 
a comparison.I0 
The frequent realignments  and  speculative  attacks,  coupled with  the  in- 
creased volatility in interest rates that they induced, motivated a shift toward a 
third, and so far last, stage in exchange rate policy, the shift to a crawling band 
effected in December 1991. The adoption of a crawling central panty rate was 
seen as a more credible commitment than the earlier regime, and this rate was 
still assigned the role of a key nominal  anchor. After making a 3%  upward 
adjustment in the central parity rate, the authorities announced that the latter 
would not be fixed at a nominal value; instead, it would crawl daily at a pre- 
announced rate of 9% per year.]’ It was hoped that  such an annual nominal 
depreciation  of  12% would be more than enough to prevent deterioration  in 
the competitiveness of exports associated with a positive differential between 
domestic and foreign inflation. The crawling band is shown in figure 6.1  1. The 
main motivation for this regime was to reduce as much as possible the uncer- 
tainty about the size and timing of  realignments of the central parity rate, and 
10. See Pessach and Razin (1990) for an earlier empirical application of target zone models 
to Israel. 
11. This crawling band differs from the one adopted in Chile in one important aspect: while 
Israel’s hand features a preannounced crawling path for the nominal central parity exchange rate, 
Chile’s central parity rate is set within the year to accommodate differences between domestic and 
foreign inflation. Thus, Chile’s system is more accommodative, and therefore could have a weaker 
stabilizing impact on inflation expectations, than Israel’s. For a more detailed comparison of  per- 
formance under these two systems, see Helpman and Leiderman (1992). 203  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
consequently to attempt to reduce the extent of domestic interest rate volatility. 
Indeed, the level and volatility of  domestic interest rates were considerably 
reduced since the adoption of this new system (see fig. 6.12). 
The experience  accumulated thus far illustrates the costs and benefits of 
exchange rate-based  stabilization. Fixing the exchange rate at the outset of the 
1985 stabilization program played a key role in quick disinflation and served 
as a visible anchor to the nominal system and to inflation expectations. How- 
ever, as long as domestic inflation does not reach world inflation levels, pres- 
sures arise for exchange rate adjustments in order to attenuate the degree of 
real exchange rate appreciation.  l2 These adjustments, that is devaluations, give 
rise to serious policy dilemmas because of concerns with their possible desta- 
bilizing impact on inflation expectations and on increased interest rate volatil- 
ity. While the shift to an exchange rate band allowed more day-to-day flexibil- 
ity in  exchange rate  determination, it did not  remove from the  system the 
uncertainty about future realignments and therefore was also accompanied by 
substantial interest rate volatility. If credible, a crawling band system, such as 
the one adopted in December 1991, has the potential of reducing this interest 
rate volatility while at the same time avoiding a deterioration in the competi- 
tiveness of exports. Overall, with the benefit of hindsight, we conclude that the 
adoption of a fixed exchange rate at the beginning of the stabilization program 
played a major role in its success. However, we believe that beginning with 
1988 there was room for a more flexible exchange rate policy, such as the 
adoption of a crawling exchange rate band, designed to prevent real apprecia- 
tion and some of the increased unemployment. 
6.4.2  Devaluation Expectations and the Exchange Rate Band 
We argued that the observed level and volatility of domestic interest rates 
during the period  1989-91  can be related to expectations of realignments, or 
more broadly a lack of credibility of the existing exchange rate band. Under 
an exchange rate band, the domestic-foreign interest rate differential set at a 
point  in  time may  reflect  both  expectations of  exchange  rate  depreciation 
within the existing band, and expected realignments of the central parity rate 
(or devaluations). While expected depreciations within the band need not be 
equal to zero even under full band credibility, it is clear that nonzero expected 
devaluations do represent lack of full credibility. This section provides a quan- 
titative  assessment  of  these  expectations, using  a  methodology  similar  to 
Svensson (1991). 
At each point in time, the log of the spot exchange rate (3,) can be expressed 
12. In this context, Dombusch has argued that “[tlhe key issue then is to select the initial level 
of the exchange rate so that even with moderate inflation for a few months, the real exchange rate 
is not overvalued from the  start. Moreover, very soon, exchange rate policy should shift from a 
fixed rate to a crawling peg to offset inflation differentials and maintain competitiveness. . . .  But 
if the decision is postponed too long, the real exchange rate becomes starkly overvalued, and the 
program ultimately fails” (1991.27). 204  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
as the sum of two components: the log of central parity (c,)  and percentage 
deviation from such central rate (x,).I3 That is, 
(1) 
Accordingly, the percentage depreciation in the exchange rate from r to t + 1 
can be expressed as the sum of exchange rate depreciation within the band and 
of  the rate  of  realignment  (defined as the percentage  change in  the central 
parity rate): 
(2) 
s, =  x,  + c,. 
As,+, =  &,+I  + Ac,+,. 
Taking expectations of both sides of equation (2) conditional on time t infor- 
mation yields an expression for expected exchange rate depreciation: 
(3)  E,AS,+~  =  E,Ax,+, + E,Ac,+,. 
That is, the expected total rate of depreciation equals the expected rate of  de- 
preciation within the band (i.e., E,AX,+~)  plus the expected rate of realignment 
(i.e., E,Ac,  + ,). 
In order to make this equation operational, additional assumptions are re- 
quired  since all three variables  are unobservable.  Assuming  that  uncovered 
interest parity holds, the left-hand side of the above equation is equal to the 
domestic-foreign  interest rate differential. While this assumption makes total 
expected depreciation observable, further assumptions are needed to decom- 
pose this depreciation into its two components, To do so, we assume that ex- 
pectations of exchange rate depreciation within the band are approximated by 
a linear equation of the form 
(4) 
where dJ is a dummy for regime j (each period between realignments) and the 
n + 1 parameters to be estimated are Pnj for j = 1 to n and PI.  Assuming that 
the error term in this equation is orthogonal to the explanatory variables, these 
parameters can be estimated by least squares. Alternatively, the expected future 
exchange rate within the band may be estimated, as in equation (5). Clearly, 
the estimation of equation (5) is equivalent to the estimation of  equation (4). 
The coefficients and error terms of  (4) and (5) are related by yo, = Po,,  y, = PI 
+ 1,  and TI,+,  = 
To summarize, using the interest differential for E,AS,,~  and the fitted values 
from equation (4)  or (3,  we are able to construct a series for expected devalua- 
13. We obviously assume that the log of  one plus the percentage deviation of the exchange rate 
from the central parity is well approximated by such percentage deviation itself. 205  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
tion, which is equal to expected  total exchange rate depreciation minus ex- 
pected depreciation within the band (conditional on no realignment). 
This procedure was implemented on weekly  time series for Israel for the 
period of January 1989 through July 1992. The interest rate differential, Sf = 
i, -  i,*  is defined as the difference between the weekly Israeli monetary auction 
rate and a weighted basket (using the currency basket weights) of foreign trea- 
sury bill rates. The exchange rate used is Israel’s currency basket. The number 
of band regimes is n = 6, where band number 6 is the crawling band regime 
that was described earlier. In all cases, we excluded from the sample all weeks 
in which a devaluation occurred. The estimation results using equation (5) are 
shown in table 6.1 1. 
In  addition, we considered expanding equation (5) to include a lag of  the 
depreciation within the band, x,-, ,  and nonlinear elements as explanatory vari- 
ables. The modified equation is 
and the estimation results are shown in table 6.12. 
Figure 6.13 describes the outcomes of these calculations. Despite the use of 
weekly  data, the estimated version  of  equation  (6) fits quite well the actual 
behavior  of  exchange  rate depreciation  within  the band.  The estimated  ex- 
pected  rate  of  devaluation  exhibits the  following patterns.  During  the  first 
band, there  was a gradual decrease in devaluation  expectations,  which  was 
reversed  a few weeks before the end of the band, resulting in a buildup of 
expectations and increase in the domestic-foreign interest rate differential. 
The second band exhibits positive expected devaluation throughout its exis- 
tence, with a gradual upward trend until the next realignment. The third band 
shows an initial decrease in expected devaluation, followed by a sharp increase 
Table 6.11  Estimation Results of Equation (5) 
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Table 6.12  Estimation Results of Equation (6) 







































in these expectations, also reflected in the interest differential. The shift to the 
fifth band was apparently unexpected. However, the shift to the sixth band was 
preceded by a speculative run on foreign currencies and by sharply increased 
expectations of devaluation. In this episode, these expectations were met with 
massive central bank intervention  in the foreign exchange market,  interven- 
tion  that  succeeded in  bringing  expected  devaluation  down  subsequently. 
Thus, there was an important surprise element in the shift to a crawling band. 
During  the first eight months of  the new  regime,  no expectations of  major 
devaluations arose. 
To test for the joint credibility of the various bands, we estimated the follow- 
ing equation for expected devaluation: 
(7)  A;,+,  = (Y  + P(e, -  e,). 
Under the null hypotheses  that the bands were credible, intercept = slope = 
0, and the residuals ought to be white. Notice that we used the position of the 
exchange rate within the band as the main explanatory variable, as it appeared 
from figure 6.11 that there is a link between this variable and expectations of 
deva1~ation.l~  The estimation results of equation (7) are shown in table 6.13. 
14. For a model that has such an implication, see Cukierman, Kiguel, and Leiderman (1992). 
We have conducted similar tests using monthly Israeli data and have found the qualitative results 
to be similar to those shown here. In addition, we have examined whether macroeconomic vari- 
ables (such as the money supply, industrial production, the real exchange rate, and foreign re- 
serves) can explain the expected rates of devaluation. We do so by  adding macroeconomic vari- 
ables to the right-hand side of equation (7) as explanatory variables. We  find the main results are 
unchanged: the value of the parameter p is unchanged, the constant remains significantly higher 
than zero, and there is evidence of serially correlated errors. For a comparison of these results 207  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
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Fig. 6.13  Elements of devaluation expectations 
Source: For a, Bank of Israel, Research Department database. 
Note: Weekly data, January  1989 through July 1992. Breaks in data indicate a devaluation. 
The results indicate an important degree of lack of credibility of exchange rate 
bandsL5  Lack of credibility shows in that the intercept and slope coefficients 
are significantly different from zero, and the residuals are serially correlated. 
The sample mean for expected devaluation throughout the total sample period 
and each of the various bands is shown in table 6.14. Figure 6.14 presents the 
expected rate of  devaluation with 95%-significance confidence intervals for 
zero devaluation expectations within each band. 
We conclude that, although the adoption of exchange rate bands in 1989 was 
an important step in making exchange rate policy more flexible, the fixity of 
the central parity rate in each band was  not considered credible by  market 
participants. This was reflected in the behavior of expected devaluation and in 
2 
with results of other countries with unilateral bands (such as Finland, Norway, Sweden, andchile), 
see Bufman, Kiguel, and Leiderman (1992). 
15. This confirms the conclusions of Helpman and Leiderman (1992) using less formal methods. 208  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
Table 6.13  Estimation Results of Equation (7) 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
01  0.0041  0.0001 









Table 6.14  Mean of Expected Rate of Devaluation (% per week) 
Period  Mean  t-Statistic of Mean 
Total period  0.08  2.568 
Band  I  0.06  1.511 
Band 2  0.11  3.657 
Band 3  0.19  1.266 
Band 4  0.09  2.925 
Band 5  0.07  0.716 
Crawling band regime  -0.01  -0.401 
interest rate volatility. These considerations certainly played an important role 
in the transition toward a band regime with a crawling central parity rate, like 
the one adopted in December 199  1. 
6.4.3  Real Exchange Rate Appreciation and Exports 
As shown in section 6.2, inflation stabilization was accompanied by substan- 
tial appreciation of the real exchange rate and by  a shift of  resources toward 
the nontraded sector. Thus, it was argued that these developments discouraged 
production and entry of  firms into the exports sector, which shared a sizable 
burden in exchange rate-based  stabilization. While these arguments have their 
merits, it is difficult to determine how much of  observed real exchange rate 
appreciation was due to the nominal exchange rate policy per se and how much 
was due to fundamentals. In any case, the purpose of this section is to take a 
new look at the relation between real exchange rate appreciation and exports, 
controlling for other factors that may affect exports as well. 
Specifically, we estimate here a reduced-form equation for the rate of growth 
of exports of  industrial goods as a function of the rates of growth of the real 
exchange rate, world imports, the real wage per labor hour in industry, and the 
real ex post interest rate in industry. We used quarterly data expressed as annual 
rates of growth (except for the interest rate). We focused on industrial exports 
excluding diamonds, and examined their statistical relation to fluctuations in 
the real interest rate, the real cost of labor, real effective exchange rate, and an 
external  impulse  (world  imports).  The real  interest  rate  applied  here  is  a 209  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
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Fig. 6.14  Expected rate of devaluation 
Nore: Horizontal lines mark 95%-significance confidence intervals of zero devaluation 
expectations. Breaks in data indicate a devaluation. 
weighted average of  the following four rates (using the relevant weights for 
industry in each period): credit in NIS allocated by  the government (i.e., di- 
rected credit), directed credit in  foreign currency, credit obtained in the free 
market (i.e., nondirected credit) in NIS, and nondirected credit in foreign cur- 
rency.  Ex post  real interest rates were  obtained by  subtracting the rate of 
change in the wholesale price of industrial outputs (WPI) from these calculated 
effective nominal interest rates. The cost of  labor in the industrial sector was 
measured by the cost of labor per work hour in industry. This measure includes 
wages, salaries, and other labor expenses in industry. The real effective ex- 
change rate is used as an indicator of the relative prices of industry in Israel 
vis-A-vis  those of  Israel’s main  trade partners and  as a partial  measure of 
profitability in the industrial sector. The real exchange rate was computed by 
deff ating the exchange rate of the NIS against the currency basket by the WPI 
in Israel and the countries represented in the currency basket. The foreign WPI 
is a weighted average of the WPIs in the United States, France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan. In  order to get the real effective exchange rate 
relevant to the industrial sector, export subsidies were taken into account. The 
ratio of  subsidies to industrial exports compared to  the value of  industrial 
goods exported was computed and applied to the real exchange rate. 
In order to focus on real fluctuations, the dollar value of  the industrial ex- 
ports (excluding diamonds) was deflated using the correspondence export price 
index as shown in  Israel’s trade statistics. The export function that was esti- 
mated is: 210  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
where  DEXPORT,  =  [(industrial  exports),]/[(industrial  exports), +]  - 1 ; 
DWORLD, = [(world importsj,l/[(world imports),-,]  -  1; DRER,-, = [(real 
exchange ratej,l/[(real  exchange rate),-,]  - 1; DWAGE, = [(labor costs per 
hour in industry),l/[(labor costs per hour in industry),-,-  1; and DINT, = [(real 
interest rate (industry)),] -  [(real interest rate (industry)),-,] -  1. All variables 
are expressed in real terms. Equation (8) was estimated using quarterly data 
from first quarter 1979 to fourth quarter 1990. 
In order to insure the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistency of 
the covariance matrix during the estimation of equation (8), we used Parzen’s 
lag window approach (this technique and similar ones such as Newey and West 
[1987] are discussed in Andrews [ 19911). The interpretation of the coefficients 
is as follows: p, is the reduced-form elasticity of export growth with respect 
to world import, P,  is the elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate, P, is 
the elasticity with respect to wages in industry, and p,  is the reduced-form 
elasticity with respect to the real interest rate in industry. Notice that the real 
exchange rate was entered with a lag. The use of four differences is motivated 
by the notion that the impact of world demand or real exchange rate on exports 
is effected with lags, and by the attempt to remove seasonality from our calcu- 
lations. The results are shown in table 6.15. 
Our results indicate that the rate of growth of world imports has a significant 
positive coefficient, as does the rate of change of the real exchange rate. The 
elasticity of exports with respect to world demand is estimated at 1.861, and 
its 95%-confidence interval is (0.629, 3.093). The estimated elasticity for the 
real exchange rate is 0.857 and its confidence interval is (0.216, 1.499). These 
elasticities fall in the range of previous export function estimates for Israel. 
The coefficients  on the remaining variables  (i.e., real wage and real interest 
rate) are not precisely estimated. 
Table 6.15  Estimation Results of Israeli Export Equation (8) (industrial exports, 
excluding diamonds) 
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Fig. 6.15  Industrial exports: actual and simulated values 
Nufe: The simulated values are based on the estimation results of equation (8) while alternately 
holding the real exchange rate and world imports at their values at the start of the stabilization 
program. Quarterly simulated values are accrued to create the annual projections shown. 
To assess the relative importance of world demand and real exchange rate in 
the performance of exports over the sample period, we used the coefficients of 
equation (8) to simulate the behavior of the rate of  growth of  exports under 
various scenarios. The simulation is given in figure 6.15, which includes three 
elements: (1) the actual rate of  growth of exports expressed in annual terms; 
(2)  the predicted rate of  growth of  exports under the restriction that the real 
exchange rate is fixed at its value at the start of the program-which  isolates 
the impact of  world demand on Israeli exports over the sample; and (3) the 
predicted rate of  growth of  exports under  the assumption that  there is  no 
change in the level of  world demand-thus  capturing the separate effect of 
real exchange rate fluctuations. Due to the existence of a regression residual, 
the simulated paths do not exactly sum up to the actual path. From the figure, 
two types of patterns are evident. First, from 1986 to 1987 and from 1989 to 
1990, the rate of  growth of  exports moved  in the same direction as that of 
world demand. In the former period, exports expanded (along with expansion 
of world demand), and in the latter period, the rate of growth of  exports de- 
creased along with world recession. Second, from 1987 to  1989, the rate of 
growth of exports moved in the same direction as the real exchange rate. That 
is, it decreased along with a more pronounced real exchange rate appreciation. 
Although the estimated relations allow for one-year lags, it is well to exam- 
ine whether longer lags and more complicated dynamics show up in the data 
as well. To deal with this issue, we estimated bivariate vector autoregressions 212  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
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Fig. 6.16  Response of industrial exports to a one-standard-deviation  shock of 
(a) world imports and (b) the real exchange rate 
Notes: The vector autoregressive system estimated is a bivariate log-log system with four lags: 
4 
In(Exp,) = const + C ([P,I~(ExP,-,)I  + [yJn(x, ,111. 
I= I 
In panel a, x is world imports, and in panel b, x is the real exchange rate. The system was 
estimated using quarterly data of the Israeli economy from first quarter 1979 to first quarter 
1990. 
for the rate of growth of exports and the rates of growth of world demand and 
the real exchange rate using four lags for each variable. Figures 6.16 and 6.17 
depict the dynamic effects of real exchange rate and world demand shocks on 
exports, in the form of impulse response functions. The evidence indicates that 
the most important effects operate with a one-period lag, and that indeed real 
exchange rate depreciation and increased world demand are associated with 
higher rate of  growth of exports. 
Overall, the foregoing findings indicate that the behavior of exports after the 213  Israel’s Stabilization: Some Important Policy Lessons 
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Fig. 6.17  Response of industrial export growth rate to a one-standard-deviation 
shock of (a) the rate of world import growth and (b) the rate of real exchange 
rate change 
Notes: The vector autoregressive system estimated is a bivariate system with four lags, applied to 
annual rates of growth: 
In panel a, x is world imports, and in panel b, x is the real exchange rate. The system was 
estimated using quarterly data of the Israel economy from first quarter 1979 to first quarter 1990. 
1985 stabilization program cannot be attributed solely to fluctuations in the 
real exchange rate; changes in world demand played an important role as well. 
However, the partial impact of the real exchange rate on exports was negtive 
for most of  the sample period, thus capturing the effect of  the marked real 
appreciation observed during the sample period. Whether such real apprecia- 
tion was  avoidable, and whether it was the result of  nominal exchange rate 214  Gil Bufman and Leonard0 Leiderman 
policy per se or of underlying fundamentals, are important issues whose reso- 
lution must await further research. 
6.5  Conclusions 
In assessing the main lessons from Israel’s disinflation, and the applicability 
of  similar  stabilization  programs  to other economies, this paper draws two 
main conclusions. First, in countries where the initial conditions in terms of 
investment and growth are not strong, the adoption of policy measures aimed 
at increasing the stock of public sector capital, especially infrastructures, right 
at the time of  stabilization may well contribute to acceleration  of transition 
from stabilization  to growth. In this context,  Israel’s program embodied no 
specific direct policy measures aimed at reversing this state of affairs, and we 
argued that this may have played an important role in the lack of fast transition 
to growth after disinflation. 
Second, any exchange rate-based  stabilization faces the issue of how and 
when to relax exchange rate targets and to adapt them to changing economic 
conditions without losing their value as key nominal anchors. We  found that 
Israel’s adoption of an exchange rate band in 1989 was an important  step in 
making exchange rate policy more flexible. Yet as domestic inflation continued 
to exceed foreign inflation, the fixity of the central parity rate in each band was 
not considered credible by market participants. Under these circumstances, it 
may be most appropriate to shift to a band regime with a preannounced crawl- 
ing central parity rate, like the one adopted in December 1991. 
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Comment on Chapters 5 and 6  JOS~  De Gregorio 
The two papers presented in this session are very interesting and cover a wide 
range of issues. In my discussion I want to focus on three issues raised by the 
authors: the relationship between inflation and income distribution, the evolu- 
tion  of  consumption  after the Israeli  stabilization,  and  exchange rate  man- 
agement. 
Inflation and Income Distribution 
The paper by Cardoso, Paes de Barros, and Urani (CPU henceforth) presents 
time series evidence on the role of  macroeconomic conditions on income dis- 
tribution in Brazil. After a detailed review of the evidence for the six largest 
metropolitan areas of Brazil, they conclude that inflation and unemployment 
have had  a negative  impact on income distribution.  In addition, they  argue 
that, although an unequal education distribution may be an important cause for 
inequality, it is not important in explaining the evolution of inequality during 
the 1980s. 
The data used  by  CPU correspond  to the distribution  of  labor earnings; 
hence, the authors conclude that the data capture only the effects of inflation 
on income distribution  stemming from imperfect wage indexation.  That is, 
wages  of  high-income  people appear to be more protected  from inflation 
(through indexation) than those of the poor. 
Given that indexation and other forms of protection of labor earnings from 
inflation  usually appear in countries that have experienced at least two-digit 
inflation, one may wonder whether CPU's finding applies to other countries.' 
To examine this issue, I present some empirical evidence on the relationship 
between income distribution and inflation in a cross section of countries. The 
sample consists of forty-six countries, where data on income distribution are 
available for the 1960s and 1980s. 
The first specification reported below has as dependent variable an index of 
inequality (ZNEQSO). This index is constructed as the ratio between the share 
of income earned by the richest 20% of the population and the share of income 
earned by  the poorest 20% of the population. The year for each data point is 
different, but the data are centered on 1980. The secondary school enrollment 
ratio in  1960 (SEC60)  was used to capture the effects of the distribution  of 
education. Although this index does not compare enrollment ratios at different 
education levels, it is a good proxy for education distribution because it repre- 
sents an intermediate stage in the educational process. Inflation is another ex- 
planatory variable and is measured  as the logarithm of the average inflation 
JosC De Gregorio is an  economist in the research department of  the International Monetary 
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1. Blejer and Gucrrero (1990) find similar results for the Philippines. 
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rate from 1960 to 1985 (LINF). Finally, dummy variables for Latin America 
and Africa (LAMER and AFRICA) were included to control for cultural, insti- 
tutional, and other factors that were excluded in the regressions and that could 
account for the fact that income distribution in these regions is worse than in 
the rest of the world. This regression can be interpreted as the effect that educa- 
tion, inflation, and continental characteristics have  on the long-run level of 
equality. The result for the sample of forty-six countries is (t-statistics in paren- 
theses). 
(1)  INEQ80 = 9.966 + 0.123 LINF -  6.535 SEC60 
(3.32)  (0.12)  (- 1.70) 
+ 10.73 AFRICA, + 10.66 LAMER, 
(3.71)  (5.21) 
R2 = 0.61, N = 46. The result for the sample excluding Latin American coun- 
tries is 
(2)  INEQ80 = 10.30 -  0.108 LINF -  6.133 SEC60 
(4.73)  (-0.14)  (-2.78) 
+10.84 AFRICA, 
(6.71) 
R2 = 0.14, N = 36. 
The overall fit of  the regressions is good. They explain over 60% of  the 
variability of  income distribution across countries. Three main conclusions 
emerge from these results. First, education distribution, measured by  SEC60, 
is an important determinant of income distribution in the long run. Second, 
after controlling for education, the level of  inequality in Latin America and 
Africa is greater than in the rest of the countries of the sample. Third, inflation 
performance has no effect on the level of ineq~ality.~ 
The finding that inflation is not important to whether a certain country has 
relatively better or worse income distribution does not necessarily imply that 
inflation has no effects on inequality. In fact, what CPUs  results suggest is that 
the improvement or deterioration of income distribution depends on the rate of 
inflation. That is, changes in income distribution are correlated with injution. 
The following two regressions look at this correlation by regressing the change 
in inequality between  1980 and  1960 (AZNEQ = ZNEQ80/INEQ60)  on the 
logarithm of the rate of inflation, the change is secondary school enrollment 
2. The data sources are as follow: INEQ80, Larrain and Vergara (1992):  INEQ60 (same variable 
as INEQ80 but centered on 1960).  Alesina and Perotti (1992);  LINE International Financial Statis- 
tics (to eliminate outliers in  inflation, which distort the  average rate  of inflation for the whole 
period 1960-85, the observations for Argentina and Bolivia in 1985 and Chile in 1974 were elimi- 
nated); SEC60 and SEC85; Barro and Wolf (1989). 
3. The results are robust to the use of secondary school enrollment ratio in  1970 and inflation 
between 1970 and  1985. In  addition, when Gini coefficients were used as proxies for inequality, 
the significance  of SEC60 increased, and inflation remained not significantly different from zero. 218  Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 
ratios during a similar period (ASEC = SEC85/SEC60),  and the continental 
dummies, for the full sample and the  sample that excludes Latin  American 
co~ntries:~ 
(3)  AINEQ = 0.573 + 0.186 LINF -  0.041 ASEC 
(2.02)  (1.60)  (-0.71) 
+ 1.692  AFRICA + 0.499 LAMER, 
(2.40)  (2.1  7) 
R2 = 0.42, N = 40; and 
(4)  AINEQ = -0.094  + 0.489 LINF -  0.028 ASEC 
(-0.27)  (3.19)  (-0.53) 
+ 1  S89 AFRICA, 
(2.50) 
R2 = 0.42, N = 31. 
The results show that inflation leads to increased inequality and that changes 
in education do not  explain  the changes in inequality. The result excluding 
Latin America is even ~tronger,~  suggesting that this correlation is not caused 
by the presence of high-inflation  countries. Thus, the evidence reported here 
suggests that the negative effects of inflation on the change in income distribu- 
tion is not particular to Brazil or high-inflation  countries. However, this evi- 
dence should be considered preliminary for at least two reasons. Since data 
on income distribution have serious problems that make comparisons difficult 
across countries and over time, this evidence, although suggestive, has to be 
considered preliminary. More work will have to be done to establish the ro- 
bustness of the results presented above. 
Stabilization and Consumption Boom 
Bufman’s and Leiderman’s paper provides a nice description of the stabiliza- 
tion program in Israel, and draws some important policy lessons. One interest- 
ing fact that they report is the existence of a consumption boom at the onset of 
the program  and a posterior recession. This evolution of  consumption is not 
particular to Israel, and as reported by Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) is a common 
phenomenon in some other episodes, in particular in exchange rate-based  sta- 
bilizations. Moreover, the consumption boom appears to be followed almost 
inevitably by a recession. This consumption cycle, however, is not observed in 
money-based stabilizations. The hypothesis that has received most attention is 
so-called temporariness. This hypothesis, advanced by Calvo ( 1986), suggests 
that the lack of credibility on the sustainability of the low inflation rate will, 
4. Another rationale for using the change of inequality rather than the level as dependent vari- 
able is that inequality indices are not comparable across countries, since they come from different 
sources and are constructed using different methodologies. 
5. In regression (3), LINF is only significant at 12%.  The results were the same when the change 
in the Gini coefficients were used instead of the ratio between the extreme quintiles. However, in 
that case, LINF was significant at 5% and 10% in all of those regressions. 219  Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 
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Fig. 6C.1  Consumption of durables 
through intertemporal substitution, lead individuals to anticipate consumption. 
The mechanism is the temporary reduction of the effective price of consump- 
tion goods (through a decline in the nominal interest rate). Bufman and Leider- 
man find this explanation unsatisfactory because it requires a decline in  the 
real interest rate, which was not the case in Israel. Furthermore, one can argue 
that in the case of  Israel there were no expectations that the plan would be 
unsuccessful (Bruno, 1993).  Indeed, the expectations that Israel’s stabilization 
would fail would have turned out to be wrong, since the reduction of inflation 
has lasted for more than seven years. 
I want to present another explanation for the consumption cycle associated 
with exchange rate-based  stabilizations. It is based on the observation that 
most of the rise in consumption occurs in the category of durables (Dornbusch 
1986; Drazen 1990).6 
An important characteristic of durable goods is that they are indivisible and, 
therefore, bought infrequently. In addition, the purchase of durable goods in- 
volves transaction costs. Now,  consider an economy consisting of  four con- 
sumers (fig. 6C.1), each of  them buying a unit of  durable goods every four 
periods, but at different times. Thus, discrete purchases at the individual level 
appear as smooth behavior of consumption of durables at the aggregate level. 
Now assume that an exchange rate-based  stabilization is implemented. Con- 
trary to money-based stabilizations, exchange rate-based  stabilizations gener- 
ally induce positive wealth effects, at least in the short run. This wealth effect 
may be caused by several mechanisms, for example, the expectation of higher 
income as the result of the return to stability; the relaxation of liquidity con- 
straints as a consequence of the increase in real wages, disposable income, and 
the supply of banks’ credit; and the reduction of interest payments stemming 
from the reduction of the nominal interest rate. The wealth effect will cause an 
expansion of both durable and nondurable consumption goods, but what dnves 
the consumption cycle (a boom followed by  a recession) is the change in the 
timing of consumption of durables. In contrast, in money-based stabilizations, 
the slow adjustment of prices and the consequent contraction of real balances 
leads to an immediate reduction of output. 
6. This explanation is developed formally in De  Gregorio, Guidotti, and V6gh  (1992), from 
which the following discussion is based. That paper also presents additional evidence on the con- 
sumption cycle in exchange rate-based  stabilizations. 220  Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 
Individuals’ reaction to a wealth shock will be to anticipate the purchase of 
the next durable good, and to buy a more expensive one. For simplicity, con- 
sider the case illustrated in figure 6C. 1, where individuals A, B, and C decide 
to buy a new durable at the onset of the stabilization, while D will wait for one 
period, since she bought a new durable good just before the stabilization. The 
behavior of the economy will be quite different after the stabilization. There 
will be a consumption boom followed by a recession. This explanation appears 
to be consistent with the evolution of consumption of durables in Israel as well 
as in other stabilization programs.’ 
Understanding  the evolution of  consumption  is important not  only at the 
theoretical level, but also in terms of policy implications. If the consumption 
cycle were  the result  of  lack of  credibility,  the slowdown  of  consumption 
would be an indication that, at least from the public’s point of view, the pro- 
gram is close to the end. In contrast, if the consumption cycle were the result 
of a dynamic in consumption of durables as described above, the consumption 
slowdown would not imply that the stabilization is at risk. 
Using the Exchange Rate to Stop Inflation 
Perhaps the most important lesson we learned from the stabilization in Israel 
is the need for flexibility in the exchange rate policy. Although the exchange 
rate was chosen as the nominal anchor, the authorities kept the option of ad- 
justing the exchange rate whenever necessary. This is an important element, 
since a real appreciation is an inevitable consequence of exchange rate-based 
stabilizations. By not basing the success of the stabilization on having an irrev- 
ocable fixed exchange rate, the Israeli authorities were able to adjust the nomi- 
nal exchange rate to protect competitiveness and to defend the program against 
the main threat to an exchange rate-based  stabilization: the unsustainability of 
the current account. 
It seems there is broad agreement that the first stage in a stabilization should 
reduce the rate of inflation from three digits to, say, 20%. Attempts to achieve 
one-digit inflation in a short period of time may be unsustainable in the me- 
dium term. Once a moderate rate of inflation has been achieved, on a perma- 
nent basis, the focus should be on the recovery of competitiveness, and then 
the more ambitious objective of bringing inflation down to one digit should be 
pursued. The adoption of an exchange rate band with the central panty follow- 
ing a crawling peg is a good solution during moderate inflation. 
Although I agree that it is better to have crawling rather than jumping central 
parity  (such as the case of  Israel during the period  1989-91),  the evidence 
provided by Bufman and Leiderman to support this conclusion is not convinc- 
ing. The main piece of  evidence presented  in the paper is the estimation of 
devaluation expectations in the period of fixed central parities. They argue that 
7. Allowing for idiosyncratic shocks, the economy will converge to a steady state where the 
consumption cycle vanishes (see Caballero and Engel 1992). 221  Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 
the central parities were not credible and that lack of  credibility resulted in 
increased interest rate volatility. 
The problem with Bufman’s and Leiderman’s interpretation is that the au- 
thorities did not  announce that the central parity  would remain unchanged; 
hence, there is no issue of credibility involved (in contrast, for example, with 
the functioning of  the European Monetary  System). They estimate expecta- 
tions of realignment, but not credibility of a certain policy. Moreover, it could 
be argued that the public quite accurately predicted the realignments because 
it knew the implicit policy followed by the authorities. In this case, however, 
the conclusion that the operation of the band introduced excessive (in the sense 
of undesirable) volatility is not warranted. 
Finally, another puzzling result of the estimations is that during some weeks 
there were expectations of revaluation of the central parity (most notably right 
after the fourth realignment!), which seems to be inconsistent with the percep- 
tion that the real exchange rate was appreciating from some equilibrium level. 
Perhaps analyzing more carefully some of the assumptions used to derive the 
estimated regression, such as the assumption of uncovered interest parity, or 
the approximation used to estimate expectations, may help better understand- 
ing of the operation of exchange rate bands. 
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